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[W]hen the last scene of all comes, and death takes his master in its embrace
and his body is laid in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends pursue
their way, there by his graveside will the noble dog be found, his head between
his paws and his eyes sad, but open, in alert watchfulness, faithful and true,
even unto death.1
INTRODUCTION
Many pet owners feel strongly about their animals. Some feel so strongly
that they desire their pets to accompany them to the grave.2 This Article addresses the validity of pet euthanasia provisions in decedents’ wills.
Pet owners generally have the legal power to humanely euthanize their
pets. In addition, the primary focus of the law of wills is to effectuate the wishes of the decedent. These two facts seem to counsel in favor of carrying out a
testamentary instruction to humanely euthanize a companion animal. Yet courts
generally decline to enforce pet euthanasia provisions whenever an objection is
raised by someone who is willing to care for the animal. Why is this?
Neither courts nor commentators have converged on a consistent explanation as to why pet euthanasia provisions in wills should not be enforced. Some
impose a tortured construction of the language of the will to find that the testator’s very clear instruction to euthanize their pet was not their true intent. Others find the euthanization of a healthy animal to violate a public policy in favor
of animal welfare. Others find that euthanization of a healthy animal amounts
to waste, at least when the animal is purebred or otherwise monetarily valuable.
Many analyses combine bits and pieces of numerous approaches to create an
analytical potpourri to justify the result.
This Article agrees with the outcome of finding testamentary pet euthanasia provisions unenforceable. It then comprehensively analyzes each of the rationales against enforcement of pet euthanasia provisions that have been offered by courts and commentators to date. In doing so, it finds significant flaws
in the multifaceted approach employed by many courts and commentators in
the past. Instead, this Article proposes that the anti-waste doctrine should be
used as the single, simple, and sufficient rationale against enforcing pet euthanasia provisions in decedents’ wills.
To support its thesis, this Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, this Article provides background on live-hand control of animals, encompassing the legal status of animals and legal limits on a pet owner’s treatment of a companion
animal. Part II examines dead-hand control and its limits, including an explana1

136 CONG. REC. 7,882–83 (1990) (statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd) (orating a version
of George Vest’s, Eulogy of the Dog). For additional context, see ROBERT C. BYRD, 3 THE
SENATE, 1789–1989: CLASSIC SPEECHES, 1830–1993, at 437–40 (Wendy Wolff ed., bicentennial ed. 1994).
2 These testators apparently subscribe to the approach that “sometimes dead is better.” See
STEPHEN KING, PET SEMATARY 144 (1983).
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tion of how testamentary intent is determined. Part III discusses influential case
law and academic commentary surrounding dead-hand control over pet euthanization. Finally, Part IV sets forth recommendations as to how the law
should approach dead-hand control over animals.
I.

LIVE-HAND CONTROL OF ANIMALS

During her lifetime, an animal owner has broad freedom to do what she
wishes with her animal, as long as she does not treat the animal cruelly. On one
end of the spectrum, some animal owners have been known to push their pets
in baby carriages, engage in photoshoots of their sleeping pets, and even enroll
their pets in daycare. On another end of the spectrum, some animal owners, for
a variety of reasons, opt to have their otherwise healthy pets humanely euthanized. This Part examines the legal status of animals as property and the limits to the wide discretion that the law generally affords pet owners over the care
and treatment of their animals.
A. Pets Are Personal Property
Despite the unique and sentimental relationship between humans and companion animals,3 the law consistently treats pets as personal property.4
The value and status of companion animals are commonly litigated issues
in tort cases involving wrongful death of a pet.5 In these cases, claims based on
loss of companionship are generally not permitted.6 For example, consider a
case in which a county dog warden wrongfully euthanized a family’s pet dog.7

3

As the Texas Supreme Court put it in an oft-quoted passage:
[C]anine companions are treated—and treasured—not as mere personal property but as beloved
friends and confidants, even family members. Given the richness that companion animals add to
our everyday lives, losing “man’s best friend” is undoubtedly sorrowful. Even the gruffest
among us tears up (every time) at the end of Old Yeller.

Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Tex. 2013).
4 See SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (5th ed. 2014)
(“Animals are property. These three words—and their legal implications and practical ramifications—are at the core of the most significant doctrines and cases [in animal law].”); see
also Lauren M. Sirois, Comment, Recovering for the Loss of a Beloved Pet: Rethinking the
Legal Classification of Companion Animals and the Requirements for Loss of Companionship Tort Damages, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2015) (“When a companion animal is
negligently or intentionally injured or killed, no matter how beloved the animal is to his or
her human companion, the animal is still only viewed as property under the law.”).
5 The issue also arises, for example, in cases involving conversion of an animal or trespass
to chattels. See ADAM P. KARP, UNDERSTANDING ANIMAL LAW 356–68 (2016).
6 See WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 225 (citations omitted) (stating that disallowing loss
of companionship damages is “the majority rule” and listing cases). But see Brousseau v.
Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286–87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (awarding $550 for the wrongful
death of a part-German Shepard dog based on loss of companionship and loss of protective
value).
7 Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).
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The dog, named Hair Bear, was found roaming freely without identification.8
Rather than wait the seven days that was statutorily required before a stray dog
could be euthanized, the warden euthanized Hair Bear with a gunshot to the
head.9 In refusing to recognize a claim premised on loss of consortium, the
court succinctly noted that “[t]he loss of love and affection resulting from the
loss or destruction of personal property is not compensable.”10
Similarly, in actions premised on negligence, most jurisdictions disallow
recovery of emotional damages for negligent harm to an animal.11 Thus, plaintiffs in wrongful pet death cases premised on negligence are usually limited to
damages based only on economic harms.12
Different jurisdictions take different approaches to measuring economic
harms in pet-death cases. For example, one court described fair market value of
a pet to include the following considerations:
[A]n owner may seek reasonable replacement costs—including such items as the
cost of purchasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization, the cost
of neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable training. Or an owner may seek
to recover the original cost of the dog, including the purchase price and, again,
such investments as immunization, neutering, and training. Moreover, as some
courts have recognized, it may be appropriate to consider the breeding potential
of the animal, and whether the dog was purchased for the purpose of breeding
with other purebreds and selling the puppies.13

In addition, some courts have found that economic harm includes the cost
of veterinary care for an injured animal, even when the cost of veterinary care
is more expensive than the cost of acquiring a replacement animal.14 Thus, an
animal’s compensable fair market value may exceed its replacement cost.15
8

Id. at 186.
Id.
10 Id. at 187–88.
11 KARP, supra note 5, at 340 (noting, however, that damages for mental anguish may be
recoverable in certain jurisdictions for intentional or malicious injuries to animals or injuries
inflicted by veterinarians who maliciously fail to meet accepted standards of care or patently
disregard client instructions); see also WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 185 (“Depending on
the jurisdiction and the facts of the case, property-based intentional tort claims may be a
means of obtaining or at least being permitted to seek recovery of emotional distress damages and punitive damages.”).
12 See, e.g., WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 211; Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of
Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1061
(1995) (“Because companion animals are classified as property, most jurisdictions apply
‘fair market value’ as the measure of damages for their death.” (footnotes omitted)).
13
Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001) (holding that the dog owner’s concession that the dog had no resale value did not preclude her from recovering anything for
the fair market value of the animal); see also Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 464 n.12
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the fair market value of a dog is not limited to its replacement value and that “evidence that a specific animal had breeding potential or was a breeder
could be relevant to the issue of the fair market value of that specific animal”).
14 See, e.g., Kaiser v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 150, 152–53, 156 (D.D.C. 1991) (awarding $1,786.50 for treating injuries to a mixed-breed Great Dane-Labrador Retriever that was
shot by Capitol Police and ultimately died); Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662, 663–64 (N.J.
9
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Even the strictest determination of damages—the replacement value of the
animal—yields some monetary recovery for the wrongful death of a companion
animal.16 For example, in one case, a dog attacked a four-year-old boy, returned
home, and was tied in the backyard.17 The injured boy’s father tracked down
the dog and shotgunned it to death.18 The dog’s owner, a twelve-year-old boy,
sued the injured boy’s father for the wrongful death of his pet.19 Although the
only testimony regarding the value of the dog was its owner’s own estimation
that it was worth $100, the jury returned an award of compensatory damages of
$10.20 The appellate court affirmed, holding that the jury could properly consider the vicious nature of the dog when setting its value.21 It seems that even a
mean dog is worth $10 in the eyes of the law.
In another case, a jury awarded $40 as compensatory damages for the
wrongful death of a pet cat.22 While these damage awards may not be much,
they demonstrate a recognition that ordinary housecats and mixed-breed dogs
have some minimal compensable property value.23 Although the deaths of
common companion animals such as mixed-breed dogs and cats “may produce
a minimal recovery because courts tie ‘value to the owner’ to pecuniary consid-

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (affirming damage award of $2,500 for treating injuries to a tenyear-old shih tzu even though a new dog of the same breed could be acquired for $500);
Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690–91, 693 (Iowa 1996) (affirming damage
award of $326.24 for veterinary expenses related to injury to toy poodle even though testimony established that the market value of the animal was no more than $200).
15 See, e.g., McDougall v. Lamm, 48 A.3d 312, 315–16, 328 (N.J. 2012) (affirming compensatory damage award of $5,000 for the loss of a well-trained Maltipoo where the purchase
price of the actual dog had been $200, and a replacement puppy would be $1,395).
16 See, e.g., Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 479, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming
judgment of $1,500 based on stipulated replacement cost of dog); Richardson v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 455, 457 (Alaska 1985) (affirming judgment of $300
based on “the dog’s market value or replacement cost”); Shera v. N.C. State Univ. Veterinary, 723 S.E.2d 352, 353–54, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming judgment of $350 based
on replacement cost of a Jack Russell Terrier dog and refusing to consider the dog’s intrinsic
value to its owner).
17 Chalker v. Raley, 37 S.E.2d 160, 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).
18 Id. at 160–61.
19 Id. at 160.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 162.
22
See Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 147–48 (Minn. 1980).
23 See Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199, 203 (2002) (“As items of material value go, all animals have a particular value similar to that of manufactured commercial
objects . . . .”); William A. Reppy, Jr., Punitive Damage Awards in Pet-Death Cases: How
Do the Ratio Rules of State Farm v. Campbell Apply?, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 19, 20–21
(2006) (setting forth an elaborate hypothetical in which the compensatory value of a wrongfully killed dog is deemed to be $25 based on an estimation of the amount that the animal
would sell for through a classified ad).
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erations” under the strictest tests,24 loss of these animals still produces some
recovery.25
Outside of torts, another area of the law that commonly requires the valuation of animals is bankruptcy. Like tort law, bankruptcy law considers animals,
including companion animals, as property.26 Depending on the jurisdiction and
the animal’s primary use, an animal may, for example, be classified as a household good, a health aid, a commercial instrument, or an agricultural tool.27 A
companion animal, like a pet dog or cat, is generally regarded as personal property and, under the federal framework, receives an exemption when listed as an
asset.28 Thus, debtors are generally permitted to retain their companion animals
in bankruptcy proceedings. Importantly, the reasoning is not that the animals
are valueless. Instead, bankruptcy law treats pets like other household goods
with positive value—while they are assets, they need not be turned over to
creditors.29
As a type of personal property, the law assigns a positive value to animals.30 While the value may not always be much, it is something. If animals
24

Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82
NEB. L. REV. 783, 790 (2004).
25 See id. at 847 (estimating that the wrongful destruction of most pets would result in “minimal damage recoveries” because “[t]he fair market value of ordinary pets, unless they have
special qualities as breeding or working animals, is usually close to zero”).
26 Elizabeth A. Hornbrook, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Pet Care Expenses in Bankruptcy,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2014, at 56, 56 (“The Bankruptcy Code tends to relegate pets to
generic personal property valued in terms of assets, liabilities, exemptions and expenses.”).
27 See KARP, supra note 5, at 642–44 (section titled “Animals as Bankruptcy Assets”).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (providing bankruptcy exemption for animals “that are held
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor”); see also KARP, supra note 5, at 642; Hornbrook, supra note 26, at 56. Numerous states
have similar exemptions for animals listed as household goods. See Hornbook, supra note
26, at 57 (listing examples); Samantha Chestney, Red Rover, Red Rover, Please Let Me Keep
Rover: Pet Exemptions in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
297, 308–14 (2019) (same).
29 See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Smith (In re Smith), 351 B.R. 274, 277 n.6 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006)
(chastising creditor for seeking to seize all of the debtor’s household goods, including his pet
dog). For background information regarding why debtors are permitted to retain exempted
property in bankruptcy proceedings, see Chestney, supra note 28, at 304–08.
30 Numerous commentators have called for expanded legal recognition for animals above
and beyond a valuation as personal property. See, e.g., Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room
Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314,
376–78 (2007) (advocating for the recognition of a new and distinct legal category of property for companion animals); Diane M. Sullivan et al., A Modest Proposal for Advancing Animal Rights, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2008) (“It is time for all states to reject the classification of companion animals as property . . . .”); Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property
Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 531, 532–33 (1998) (“[I]t is an appropriate time for
the judiciary to take an evolutionary step in the development of the common law and remove
animals from their status as mere property.”); Elizabeth Paek, Note, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by
Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 524 (2003) (“While companion animals are proclaimed to
be family members, the law fails to embrace this social value and thus, unjustly treats these
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had no value, they essentially could not be owned because no legal action can
be properly maintained for the conversion or wrongful destruction of valueless
chattel.31 However, their value is not nothing, for “[e]ven in the days of Blackstone, while it was declared that property in a dog was ‘base property,’ it was
nevertheless asserted that such property was sufficient to maintain a civil action
for its loss.”32 As one much more recent commentator succinctly put it: “Animals are personal property, and, as personal property, they have value.”33
B. Limits on the Treatment of Animals by the Living
While the law recognizes animals as personal property, it also sets limits
on how animal owners may treat their animal property. Criminal law provisions
generally prohibit treating pets cruelly or causing them undue suffering.34 Such
anti-cruelty provisions are common at the state and local levels35 and, increasingly, at the federal level as well.36
Anti-cruelty laws, however, do not prohibit the killing of animals as a general matter. For example, animals are regularly killed for recreation,37 agricul-

animals as property.”); see also WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 56 (“[E]ven within the animal protection community there is a continuing debate as to whether animals should be
granted rights as ‘persons’ or should simply be granted an elevated property status.”).
31 Jones v. Craddock, 187 S.E. 558, 559 (N.C. 1936).
32 Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *236).
33 Duckler, supra note 23, at 199.
34 KARP, supra note 5, at 108; WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 72–74 (providing an overview of common provisions and exceptions in state anti-cruelty statutes).
35 See WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 72; Laura A. Reese & Kellee M. Remer, Best Practices in Local Animal Control Ordinances, 49 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 117, 118–24
(2017).
36 The Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) was signed into law in 1966 and is the primary federal
animal protection law. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2160. The AWA sets minimum standards for
the humane care and treatment of animals that are exhibited to the public, sold for use as
pets, used in research, or transported commercially. 7 U.S.C. § 2131. “[T]he law focuses on
several specific activities that have been shown in the past to be potential areas of animal
abuse, and that have a nationwide [effect],” such as dog fighting and interstate shipment of
stolen animals. David Favre, Overview of U.S. Animal Welfare Act, MICH. ST. UNIV.:
ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2002), https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-us-animal
-welfare-act [perma.cc/RVQ4-BPL7]. More recently, in 2019 the Preventing Animal Cruelty
and Torture Act (“PACT Act”) was signed into law. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1 note (Short Title of 2019
Amendment), 48. The PACT Act makes the crushing, burning, drowning, suffocating, impaling, or sexual exploitation of animals a federal crime. § 48; see also Extreme Animal Cruelty Can Now be Prosecuted as a Federal Crime, THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Nov. 25,
2019), https://www.humanesociety.org/news/extreme-animal-cruelty-can-now-be-prosecuted
-federal-crime [perma.cc/8TEE-F82P].
37 Approximately 11.5 million U.S. residents aged sixteen and older hunt every year. U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING,
HUNTING, AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 4 (2018); see also KARP, supra note 5, at
470–71 (noting that many anti-cruelty statutes either exempt wildlife or are preempted by
separate fish and wildlife laws).
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ture,38 and religious reasons.39 Many anti-cruelty statutes also expressly exempt
humane killings of animals from their scope. Indeed, non-therapeutic (or “convenience”) euthanasia is commonly used to end the lives of unwanted companion animals.40 One commentator put the scale of convenience euthanasia into
perspective:
At thousands of shelters throughout America, after public viewing hours have
ended, shelter workers are responsible for making several “Sophie’s Choices” as
to which dog or cat, old or young, ill or healthy, of good or bad temperament,
will be killed the next morning for no reason other than supply exceeds demand.
Each year, millions of shelter animals pass into the designated area of the facility where a technician administers a lethal injection and places their bodies in a
round barrel for rendering or group cremation.41

While humane euthanization is legal,42 certain methods of euthanization
have been deemed inhumane and therefore criminalized.43 Indeed, in certain
instances, it may be considered a criminal act to not euthanize a sick or injured
animal that is suffering.44 For example, in dogfighting cases, euthanization is
recognized as the appropriate disposition of seized animals.45
The American Veterinary Medical Association (“AVMA”) is one of the
main governing bodies for veterinarians. It has developed guidelines to encourage veterinarians to use their professional and ethical judgment prior to eu-

38

KARP, supra note 5, at 107 (“[S]laughterhouses slay billions of birds and mammals each
year.”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (declaring a federal policy that livestock shall be slaughtered humanely).
39 KARP, supra note 5, at 111–16 (discussing religious slaughter of animals).
40 Id. at 468 (labeling nontherapeutic euthanasia “a deeply unfortunate though necessary
practice”). Even in California, which by statute states that the state’s policy is that “no
adoptable animal should be euthanized if it can be adopted into a suitable home” and that
“no treatable animal should be euthanized,” abandoned animals may be humanely euthanized if no one adopts them within ten days of their abandonment. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1834.4, 1834.5(a) (West 2021).
41 KARP, supra note 5, at 107.
42 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 501(A) (2021) (providing that “[a]ny dog, cat, or other animal which is kept for pleasure rather than utility” may be disposed of by adoption into a
suitable home, delivery to a licensed facility, or euthanasia by a suitable method).
43 KARP, supra note 5, at 109 (providing examples of inhumane methods of euthanasia from
various state statutes, such as intracardiac euthanasia by injection on conscious animals, use
of carbon monoxide gas, high-altitude decompression chambers, and nitrogen gas). States
generally regulate who may legally access certain agents that are routinely used in humane
euthanization. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-29-130(a) (2021) (restricting access to sodium pentobarbital and similar agents); ALASKA STAT. § 08.02.050 (2021) (same).
44 See KARP, supra note 5, at 119 (“If the veterinarian believes that failure to euthanize constitutes animal cruelty, she may be inclined to report the client to law enforcement or animal
control.”).
45 See WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 151 (“Dogs in dogfighting operations are routinely
euthanized because of uncertainty about their demeanors and aggressiveness, coupled with
the significant resource investment it may take to rehabilitate fighting dogs.”).
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thanizing an animal.46 According to the AVMA, the “[k]illing of healthy animals . . . , while unpleasant and morally challenging, is a practical necessity.
The AVMA recognizes such actions as acceptable if those carrying out euthanasia adhere to strict policies, guidelines, and applicable regulations.”47 The
AVMA guidelines suggest that a rehoming agency should be pursued prior to
opting for euthanasia and that “[e]uthanasia of healthy pets should be considered only when alternatives are not available.”48 However, as long as the methods used to carry out euthanasia comply with applicable federal, state, and local
regulations, a pet owner may opt to have a healthy companion animal euthanized.
In short, a living individual may not treat her companion animal cruelly,
but she generally possesses the power over whether it lives or dies. Indeed, millions of companion animals are legally euthanized every year, and vastly more
non-companion animals are legally slaughtered by humans annually.
II. DEAD-HAND CONTROL AND ITS LIMITS
Testamentary freedom is the foundation of the modern law of succession.
Testators enjoy substantial discretion to decide who should receive estate property and how much should be given to each recipient. While the law typically
defers to the testator’s wishes, there are well-defined exceptions to testamentary freedom. This Part describes the importance of testamentary freedom, exceptions to testamentary freedom, and how courts determine testamentary intent.
A. The Dominance of Testamentary Freedom
“The most fundamental guiding principle of American inheritance law is
testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property during life has the
power to direct its disposition at death.”49 American inheritance law is centered
around freedom of disposition.50 As such, it “does not grant courts any general
authority to question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her property.”51
The law of succession prioritizes testamentary freedom for several reasons.
Testamentary freedom is thought to incentivize “individuals to act in ways that,
46

AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, AVMA GUIDELINES FOR THE EUTHANASIA OF ANIMALS:
2020 EDITION 4 (2020).
47 Id. at 8.
48 Euthanasia, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, https://www.avma.org/resources/pet-owners/
petcare/euthanasia [perma.cc/H8MA-6E4B].
49 Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53
B.C. L. REV. 877, 882 (2013).
50 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1 (9th ed.
2013).
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 2003).
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on the whole, benefit society at large.”52 Because individuals may designate
who they intend to pass their wealth to, they are motivated to earn, save, and
amass wealth.53 If individuals lacked control over their estates after death, they
would be more prone to engage in suboptimal behavior. Instead of accumulating sizable estates to pass on to their selected beneficiaries, “they would actually be incentivized to spend their wealth down to zero or to take back control by
giving away their wealth through inter vivos transfers.”54
Additionally, allowing broad freedom of disposition has been shown to increase the happiness of both donors and donees.55 Moreover, it incentivizes potential donees to care for aging or ailing friends and relatives who may potentially leave them estate assets.56 And, compared to others who could control the
disposition of property, donors usually have the best understanding of how estate property should be distributed in order to maximize the utility of the estate.57 If freedom of disposition was eliminated, property may be distributed
less optimally, reducing both social welfare and donor happiness.58
B. Exceptions to Testamentary Freedom
Although American law favors robust testamentary freedom and generally
allows testators to do what they wish in their wills, the law places some limits
on a decedent’s control over the distribution of her estate. Dead-hand control is
not absolute. Exceptions to testamentary freedom take the form of prescriptive
restrictions, which require certain transfers to be made, and proscriptive restrictions, which prohibit certain transfers from being made.59
Compelling transfers through prescriptive restrictions is uncommon. The
law generally requires a decedent to transfer some portion of their estate to

52

Kevin Bennardo, The Madness of Insane Delusions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 601, 605 (2018); see
also Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2013) (stating that the law of succession seeks to
“create the best incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s disposition
of property may affect”).
53 Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 283, 291.
54 Bennardo, supra note 52, at 606; see also Glover, supra note 53, at 291 (“The knowledge
that one has the ability to direct the disposition of property at death provides individuals an
incentive to be productive during life and to save and invest, rather than to consume.”).
55 Glover, supra note 53, at 289–90.
56 Id. at 291 (“The possibility of disinheritance incentivizes the provision of family caregiving, which in turn promotes overall social welfare.”).
57 Kelly, supra note 52, at 1136 (“[C]ompared to legislatures or courts, donors may possess
better information about the circumstances of family members and other donees. This informational advantage may allow donors to select the highest-valued donee (e.g., a gifted or
disabled child.)” (footnote omitted)).
58 See id. at 1137–38.
59 Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 2018 UTAH L. REV.
411, 424.
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their surviving spouse.60 A decedent’s outstanding creditors also have priority
to estate property before it is distributed according to the decedent’s wishes.61
But aside from surviving spouses and creditors, the law generally does not require any affirmative transfers.62
Prohibitions against certain transfers through proscriptive restrictions,
while still relatively uncommon, are decidedly more numerous than prescriptively compelled transfers. The slayer rule, for example, disallows a decedent to
transfer property to her slayer.63 The rule against perpetuities, as another example, limits the duration of time over which a decedent can exert control over her
estate property.64
The law also disallows transfers that would violate an established public
policy. For example, public policy prohibits a decedent from using her estate to
further an illegal cause or to break up a marriage.65 Invalidating a devise based
on public policy, however, is not done lightly. As one court put it, unless a will
provision contravenes “some positive, well-defined expression of the settled
will of the people of the state or nation, as an organized body politic,” courts
demonstrate reluctance to invalidate devises for violating public policy.66
Through what is called the anti-waste doctrine, decedents also cannot require estate property to be destroyed.67 Such wasteful destruction of property
serves no useful purpose and undermines the public good.68 It functions only to
reduce the wealth of the living and incur economic costs on society. Moreover,
the decedent does not suffer the economic consequences of the property de60

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019); see also Bennardo, supra note
52, at 608, 627–28. Like any beneficiary, a surviving spouse may refuse to accept a testamentary transfer. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1871, 1872 (2014) (“Under most circumstances today, beneficiaries are free to accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”).
61 See Glover, supra note 59, at 425.
62 For example, the law does not require a decedent to transfer any portion of her estate to
her children, even if they are minors. See Glover, supra note 59, at 442 (“The donor’s discretion to disinherit children stands in stark contrast with her legal obligation to support her minor children during life.”).
63 See Kevin Bennardo, Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries, 24 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 31, 34–
40 (2015) (explaining the slayer rule).
64 Glover, supra note 59, at 428–29.
65 See Bennardo, supra note 52, at 607–08; Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1326–27 (2011).
66 Teresa Wear, Recent Case, Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat’l Assoc., 41 MO. L.
REV. 309, 310 (1976) (quoting In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. 120, 123 (Mo. 1927)).
67 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 783, 796, 838 (2005)
(“As a general matter, the law recoils at the idea of allowing the dead hand to destroy property.”).
68 See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“To
allow an executor to exercise such power [to destroy] stemming from apparent whim and
caprice of the testatrix contravenes public policy.”); see also John H. Langbein, Burn the
Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 375, 376 n.8 (2010) (collecting cases).

22 NEV. L.J. 349

360

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

struction and thus lacks many of the normal incentives that constrain living individuals from destroying their own property.69 The anti-waste doctrine applies
to all attempts by decedents to destroy property.70 Even a decedent’s instruction
to be buried in a particular suit of clothes or piece of jewelry is rendered nonmandatory by the anti-waste doctrine because it calls for the destruction of estate property.71 Such instructions are routinely followed by the living out of respect for the dead, not because the law requires it.72 It is the decedent’s beneficiaries who possess the power to decide whether to bury—and thus destroy—a
decedent’s suit of clothes or piece of jewelry.73 The dead hand simply lacks the
power to destroy.
C. The Will as Evidence of Testamentary Intent
While the decedent’s preferences are given primary importance in the distribution of their estates, the living need to be able to reliably determine what
the decedent’s preferences were. By definition, decedents are no longer around
when it is time for their estates to be probated. Decedents are unavailable to
testify regarding whether a particular document was meant to be treated as their
legal will. They are also unavailable to testify regarding what a particular provision in a will was intended to mean. Thus, courts must look elsewhere for evidence of testamentary intent.74
Certain formalities are required to make a valid will.75 These formalities
serve multiple purposes, but a major one is to evidence that the decedent intended the document to serve as their will at the time of their death.76 The idea
is that someone would be unlikely to comply with the formalities unless they
69

See Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 839–41; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 47 cmt. e
(AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, selfinterest ordinarily restrains such conduct.”).
70 Bennardo, supra note 52, at 624 (stating that the anti-waste doctrine applies “in situations
in which assets are literally destroyed,” which “is a fairly bright-line inquiry that leaves very
little room for judgment—and therefore little room for bias”).
71 Id. at 623 n.130.
72 Some decedents’ burial instructions even call for their internment in their automobile. See
RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD
14, 158 n.4 (2010) (describing such circumstances).
73 Bennardo, supra note 52, at 623 n.130 (“[T]his practice is best viewed as an acquiescence
by the living rather than a power of the dead.”).
74 This evidentiary challenge is frequently called the “worst evidence” problem. See, e.g.,
John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2046 (1994) (book review).
75
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a), (b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (detailing the formalities necessary to execute a valid will); see also John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1975) (“The provisions of the will must
be in writing, be it print, typescript or handwriting. The testator must sign the will in the
presence of two (in a few states three) witnesses, who must then attest to the signing by their
own signatures.”).
76 Langbein, supra note 75, at 492 (“The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been
to provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent and of the terms of the will;
virtually all the formalities serve as ‘probative safeguards.’ ”).
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deliberately set out to do so: “It is difficult to complete the ceremony and remain ignorant that one is making a will.”77 As such, the formalities diminish
the risk of accidental wills. Because decedents are not around to testify regarding their actual intent, the law infers that documents that comply with certain
formalities were meant to be wills.78 Put differently, it is by complying with the
formalities that a testator communicates that she wishes a document to serve as
her legal will.
When construing the language of a will, courts are reluctant to admit evidence beyond the document itself. Indeed, a majority of states bar the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine the terms of a will through two interconnected rules.79 The first rule is the “plain meaning” or “no extrinsic
evidence” rule.80 This rule only allows extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities in the language of the will but will not allow extrinsic evidence to disturb
the plain meaning of the words the testator wrote in the will.81 This rule does
not allow the plain meaning of the words to be disturbed by evidence that the
testator intended another meaning.82
The second rule is the “no reformation” rule.83 Under this rule, courts may
not reform a will to correct a mistaken term to reflect what the testator intended
the will to say.84 Thus, extrinsic evidence generally is not permitted to show
that a testamentary provision was based on a mistake of fact on the part of the
testator.85 There is simply no way to know what the testator would have intended if she had known the truth. Would a particular man wish to disinherit his
child if he knew the truth about the child’s paternity? Would a particular parent
wish to disinherit her child if she knew the truth about the child’s irresponsible
lifestyle? Was the mistaken factual belief so material that it would change the
77

Id. at 495.
Id. (“Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for a witnessed will is meant to conclude
the question of testamentary intent.”).
79 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 328.
80 Id.
81 Id.; Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion
of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 811, 814 (2001) (“The plain
meaning rule appears simple: courts shall not admit extrinsic evidence to contradict or add to
the plain meaning of the words in a will.”).
82 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 328; see also Glover, supra note 59, at 419
(“When probate courts apply [the plain meaning] rule, they attribute the plain or ordinary
meaning to the donor’s words, and they do not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests that
the donor intended an idiosyncratic meaning.”).
83
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 328.
84 See id. (“Courts have no power to reform wills. . . . [M]istakes of testators cannot be corrected. Omissions cannot be supplied. Language cannot be modified to meet unforeseen
changes in conditions. The only means for ascertaining the intent of the testator are the
words written and the acts done by him.” (quoting Sanderson v. Norcross, 136 N.E. 170
(Mass. 1922))).
85 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 324 (2d ed.
2012) (“American courts do not usually give relief when a will is alleged to have been made
under a mistake of fact, such as the paternity of a child.”).
78
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way the testator wished to distribute her estate? Maybe yes or maybe no.86
There is simply no way for courts to know with confidence; thus, they refrain
from guessing. Instead, they follow the testator’s instructions as written in the
will, even if those instructions were premised on a mistaken belief on the part
of the testator.87
The justification for these rules is to safeguard the decedent from fraud or
error.88 Again, the decedent is no longer available at the time that a will is being interpreted. It would simply be unfair for a decedent’s testamentary intent
to be determined based on extrinsic evidence when the decedent herself is unable to refute the evidence.89 As explained above, testamentary freedom is the
core of American estate law.90 If testators lost confidence that their instructions
would be followed after their death, there would be little incentive for decedents to make wills at all.91 Thus, to safeguard the principle of testamentary
freedom, the law of wills safeguards the instructions that a testator wrote in a
will.92 Indeed, liberally admitting extrinsic evidence would undermine the purpose of the required formalities because the words of a will were executed in
compliance with the required formalities, while extrinsic evidence was not.93
Thus, extrinsic evidence is generally not permissible to show that the testator
meant something other than what they wrote.
III. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO DEAD-HAND CONTROL OVER PET
EUTHANIZATION
Typically, animals have short lifespans and predecease their owners. In the
event an animal does not predecease its owner, an animal owner may take steps
to control the disposition of their companion animal upon the owner’s death.
For example, a testator may devise an animal to a specific beneficiary as part of

86

Id. (explaining that “[m]ateriality is the great difficulty”).
Id. However, certain well-defined mistakes of omission are presumed to be material. For
example, when a testator omits a child from a will under a mistaken belief that the child is
deceased, the Uniform Probate Code awards a share of the estate property because there “is a
strong case for believing that a mistake was material.” Id. (citing UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2302(c) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010)).
88 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 328.
89 See id.
90 See supra Section II.A.
91 See Glover, supra note 59, at 419 (“If the court routinely interprets the dispositive provisions of wills in ways that do not conform with the donor’s intended estate plan, then freedom of disposition is undermined because property is distributed in an unintended manner.”).
92 See id. at 420 (“[T]he plain meaning rule’s overarching purpose is to facilitate freedom of
disposition by providing courts a reliable and consistent way to interpret the meaning of
wills.”).
93 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 328.
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an estate.94 After all, animals are property.95 However, there are limits. A testator may not legally require that an animal be treated cruelly. After all, animal
cruelty is illegal, and the dead hand cannot break the law.96
There is one type of testamentary instruction, however, that has not been
met with a consistent response: an instruction to humanely euthanize an animal
upon the death of the testator. First, it is empirically unknown how common
such provisions are, and it bears noting that these provisions generally only
make their way into the case law when they are challenged. There is reason to
believe that the majority of testamentary pet euthanasia provisions are simply
carried out without objection.97
When these provisions are challenged, they are often found to be legally
unenforceable. However, neither courts nor commentators have converged on a
stable line of reasoning as to why these instructions are legally unenforceable.
This Part summarizes the scattershot approaches that have been employed by
the courts as well as those put forward in the academic literature.
A. A Case Study: In re Capers’ Estate
If there is one case to best illustrate the various lines of reasoning applied
to invalidate pet euthanization provisions, it is In re Capers’ Estate, a 1964 decision of the Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court.98 The court’s reasoning in Capers’
Estate has been immensely influential in defining the way that subsequent
courts and commentators have framed the discussion of dead-hand control over
pet euthanasia. It literally is the textbook case—as in, it is in the leading animal
law casebook.99
Capers’ Estate centered around a testator’s directive in her will that read as
follows:
94

Gerry W. Beyer, What if Your Parrot Outlives You? Preparing for Your Bird’s Future,
Address at the Phoenix Landing Foundation Webinar 22 (Oct. 10, 2020) (manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3708429) [perma.cc/Y2H3-W9Y
X]. Not only may an animal be devised as estate property, but a trust may be created to provide for the care of a domestic or pet animal. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 408 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-907(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); see also KARP, supra note
5, at 556–60; DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 420–26; Beyer, supra, at 7–8.
95 See supra Section I.A.
96 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
97 See Frances Carlisle, The Sido Case and Beyond: Destruction of Pets by Will Provision,
CAL. VETERINARIAN, July 1981, at 26, 27 (“[M]ost pet destruction provisions in wills are carried out without the threat of litigation.”). For example, in one reported opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas, the court didn’t appear to bat an eye at a testator’s instruction that
“[m]y dog shall be put to sleep by Dr. Linam [a]t home and and [sic] buried in my yard.”
City of Austin v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 503 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. 1973). The matter was apparently uncontested. See id.
98 In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 141 (Orphans’ Ct. 1964).
99 See WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 563–68. The Capers’ Estate decision has been
summarized elsewhere, including in Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens when
Their Humans Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617, 661–63 (2000).
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I direct that any dog which I may own at the time of my death be destroyed in a
humane manner and I give and grant unto my Executors hereinafter named full
and complete power and discretion necessary to carry out the same. 100

At the time of her death, the testator owned two Irish Setter dogs, Sunny
Burch and Brickland.101 The executors of the estate filed a petition for declaratory judgment because they were unsure of whether they should follow the testator’s prescribed course of action.102 The court ultimately held that the specific
provision calling for the humane death of the two dogs was void.103 To support
this conclusion, the court relied on three distinct lines of analysis: (1) the purpose and intent of the testator, (2) public policy considerations surrounding the
euthanization of animals, and (3) public policy considerations related to antiwaste.104
To support its invalidation of the euthanization provision, the court first
identified the testator’s supposed intent behind the provision in her will. According to the court, the testator wished for her dogs to be given the same level
of care after her death as they received during her lifetime.105 The court found
that her instruction to euthanize the dogs stemmed not from a desire for the
dogs to die but from a fear that “either they would grieve for her or that no one
would afford them the same affection and kindness that they received during
her life.”106
The court found that the testatrix was “mistaken” in her concerns because,
upon her death, the dogs were taken and cared for by a kennel keeper.107 Indeed, the dogs’ veterinarian testified that the dogs were happier in their situation with the kennel keeper, which afforded them ample space to run, than they
had been under the testatrix’s care in an urban setting.108 Finding that there was
“no doubt” that the testatrix “would rather see her pets happy and healthy and
alive than destroyed,” the court found “that the basis for the provision of the
will has been eliminated.”109
To summarize, despite very clear language, the court opined that the testatrix’s true intent behind the will provision was something other than what she
had written. The court rendered the provision applicable only if the dogs were
uncared for subsequent to the testatrix’s death, despite no such qualification
appearing on the face of the will.

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d at 122.
Id. at 121.
See id. at 122.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 125–41.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 129.
Id.
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Second, the Capers’ Estate court found that carrying out the testatrix’s instruction to euthanize the dogs would violate a public policy in favor of preservation of all lives, including non-human life. In support of this finding, the
court noted “the upward development of the humane instinct in mankind for the
preservation of life of all kinds, not only of human life but of the life of lesser
species.”110 Thus, according to the court, to “confiscate the life of the two setters for no purpose” would run counter to human’s “ethical duty to preserve all
life, human or not, unless the destruction of such other life is an absolute necessity.”111
As evidence of this ethical duty in preserving life, the court pointed to the
public outcry in the form of letters to the court and media attention regarding
the testatrix’s instruction.112 In the court’s view, the public’s attention on the
matter demonstrated “a positive, well-defined and universal public sentiment,
deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people of this era, opposed
to the unnecessary destruction of animals.”113 Indeed, the court noted “a unanimity of opinion that to destroy the two Irish setters that have displayed nothing but fidelity and affection, would be an act of gross inhumanity.”114 Accordingly, the court found that the provision in the testatrix’s will instructing that
her dogs be destroyed was void for violating a public policy against taking an
animal’s life unnecessarily.
Third, the Capers’ Estate court found that a decedent does not possess the
right to destroy property through testamentary instruction. Consistent with prior
case law, the court found that while a decedent has the right to “dispose” of her
estate in the sense that she may “settle” it, a decedent has no right to order the
destruction of estate property.115
In sum, the court found the testatrix’s instruction to destroy the dogs was
first, not her true intent; second, in violation of a public policy against the unnecessary killing of animals; and third, beyond the scope of a decedent’s authority because it called for the destruction of property rather than the distribution of it. As a result, the dogs passed to the residuary beneficiary of the will,
which was the Western Pennsylvania Humane Society.116 The court further
found that the estate owed the kennel keeper roughly $2,500 for caring for the
dogs for almost two years but noted that he had offered to waive the fee in ex-

110

Id. at 130.
Id. at 130, 132.
112 Id. at 134.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 133.
115 Id. at 136–38 (quoting the brief of the Attorney General’s office with approval) (“There
is no definition or any interpretation to be found in any cases which enlarges the meaning of
the word ‘dispose’ to include destroy.” (emphasis omitted)).
116 Id. at 139–40.
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change for ownership of the dogs.117 The court urged the estate that it would be
a “prudent disposition” for the estate to accept the kennel keeper’s offer.118
B. A Second Case Study: Smith v. Avanzino
A second oft-mentioned case is the 1980 matter of Smith v. Avanzino, a
case that is preserved through a transcript of the court’s hearing rather than a
written opinion.119 The case garnered national media exposure120 and, as explained below, legislative attention. In Smith, the testatrix included a provision
in her will instructing that her Collie-Sheepdog, Sido, be euthanized upon her
death.121
On the day before the matter was scheduled to be argued in court, the governor of California signed into a law a piece of special legislation that specifically targeted the Smith testatrix’s instruction.122 While the legislation did not
identify the Smith testatrix by name, it applied only to testamentary documents
“executed by a testator who died on December 21, 1979,”123 which happened to
be the date of the Smith testatrix’s death. The legislation invalidated any testamentary provision “whereby the testator sought to compel or require the destruction of a pet dog.”124 The law noted that “special facts and circumstances”
were applicable to such a will necessitating special legislation:
[T]he testator, having the best interests of her pet dog in mind, would not wish
her instructions for the destruction of the pet dog carried out were she cognizant
of the present circumstances assuring the well being and happy future for the
dog, occurring as the result of unexpected developments following her death.125

Through this special legislation, the California legislature and governor apparently thought they knew the testatrix’s preferences better than she was able
to communicate them herself.
At the hearing the following day, the court was notified that the special legislation protecting Sido had been signed into law the previous day.126 At one
point, the hearing was halted somewhat dramatically so that the court could
117

Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139.
119 Reporter’s Transcript, Smith v. Avanzino, No. 225-698 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 1980)
[hereinafter Smith v. Avanzino Transcript].
120 The decision was covered by the CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite. See Rachid
Haoues, 1980 Flashback: The Legal Battle for a Dog’s Life, CBS NEWS (June 18, 2015, 7:37
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-greatest-dog-sido-1980-will-animal-rights/ [perma
.cc/4RK5-BNFM].
121 See Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972–1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL
L. & POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2008) for an existing account of Smith v. Avanzino in the academic literature.
122 Act of June 16, 1980, ch. 182, 1980 Cal. Stat. 402.
123 Id. § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. at 403.
124 Id.
125 Id. § 2, 1980 Cal. Stat. at 403.
126 Smith v. Avanzino Transcript, supra note 119, at 2, 4.
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22 NEV. L.J. 349

Fall 2021]

UNLEASHING PETS

367

take a phone call from the governor’s office confirming that the special legislation was in effect.127 While noting that the special legislation “perhaps render[ed] the whole issue moot,” the court went ahead with its ruling on the validity of the will provision notwithstanding the legislation.128
In support of invalidating the provision, one attorney offered for the record
3,000 letters, over 200 offers to adopt the dog, and a file of media coverage.129
While noting that such evidence was “somewhat unusual,” the attorney noted
that similar evidence had been entered into the record in the Capers’ Estate
case.130
The court opined that euthanizing the dog would be unlawful under a municipal ordinance that vested the power to decree and carry out the death of an
animal in the Animal Control Officer.131 The court further found that the public
“look[ed] with disfavor and [did] not accept the decree that the decedent had
for her dog” and expressly relied on the public policy rationale adopted by the
Capers’ Estate court.132 The court then further justified its reasoning by opining
that, although the testatrix undoubtedly “thought she was doing the very best
that in her mind could be done for her favorite companion,” she suffered from a
“troubled mind” that caused her to execute a provision that was contrary to
both law and public policy.133 As a result, the court awarded the dog to the residuary beneficiary of the testatrix’s estate, an organization called Pets Unlimited.134
C. Subsequent Commentary on Pet Euthanization Provisions
In the forty years since Smith, courts have generally followed some combination of the three lines of reasoning developed in Capers’ Estate. Commentators have been generally quite supportive of the concept that testamentary pet
euthanasia provisions need not be followed; however, they have expressed reservations about the legal effectiveness of all three of the Capers’ Estate lines of
reasoning.135 This Section chronicles the evolution of each of the three lines of
127

Id. at 4.
Id.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Id. The attorney also offered to bring the dog into the courtroom. Id.
131 Id. at 9.
132 Id. at 10.
133 Id. at 10–11.
134
Id. at 12, 14, 16. Among other things, Pets Unlimited operated a no-kill shelter, and in
2014 it merged with the San Francisco SPCA. The History of Pets Unlimited, SF SPCA,
https://www.sfspca.org/about/history/pets-unlimited/ [perma.cc/ZU6B-3KZT]. To this day,
the San Francisco SPCA runs the “Sido Program,” which allows pet owners to appoint the
SPCA as a pet’s guardian upon the death of the pet’s owner. Sido Program: Give Yourself
Peace of Mind, SF SPCA, https://www.sfspca.org/get-involved/donate/plan-your-pets-future/
[perma.cc/5333-3F4T].
135 As a result of these reservations, at least two commentators have pressed for a legislative
solution in the form of a statute that clearly prohibits testamentary pet euthanasia provisions.
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reasoning espoused in Capers’ Estate: (1) euthanization as against the testator’s
“true” intent, (2) euthanization as violative of a public policy in favor of preserving animals’ lives, and (3) euthanization as violative of the anti-waste doctrine.
First, the Capers’ Estate approach of reimagining the testator’s true intent
to nullify a pet euthanization provision has continued in the case law and commentary. Indeed, one commentator labeled interpreting “the intent of the pet
owner” as “the most common means” used by courts to invalidate such provisions.136 In one New York case, the testatrix directed in her will that her two
cats be “put to sleep as soon after my decease as is practicable” by a local veterinarian.137 Rather than interpret the instruction according to the words chosen
by the decedent, the court determined that the testatrix’s true intent was for the
cats to be euthanized only if no suitable home was found for them.138 Thus, according to the court, “the testat[rix] would have preferred her friends to assume
the care of said cats” rather than see them euthanized.139 This decision was
based solely on construction of the will rather than on public policy or any finding regarding the legality of euthanizing the cats.140
Commentators have again cautioned against relying on courts to construe
pet euthanasia provisions so creatively. Commentators noted that courts would
have difficulty interpreting their way out of a pet euthanasia provision in which
the testator is amply clear that the pet should be euthanized regardless of any
other intervening circumstances.141
Second, courts have been particularly attracted to the reasoning that provisions directing the destruction of animals are void for violating a public policy
in favor of preserving animals’ lives.142 For example, a Vermont court found a
public policy in favor of “allow[ing] animals the opportunity to continue liv-

See Philip Jamieson, The Family Pet: A Limitation on the Freedom of Testamentary Disposition?, 9 U. TAS. L. REV. 51, 59–60 (1987) (Austl.) (alteration to original) (calling for “legislative clarification” given the unclear validity of testamentary pet destruction provisions);
Frances Carlisle, Note, Destruction of Pets by Will Provision, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
894, 901–03 (1981); Carlisle, supra note 97, at 27 (“As the California law enacted to save
Sido applies only to that one dog, a more general law to cover all pets is needed.”).
136 Carlisle, supra note 97, at 27.
137 Carlisle, supra note 97, at 27 (describing In re Reed, No. 206602 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Mar. 12,
1981)); Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911, 932–33
(2001) (same).
138 Sykas, supra note 137, at 932–33.
139 Id. at 932 (quoting In re Reed, No. 206602 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Mar. 12, 1981)).
140 Id. at 933.
141 E.g., Jamieson, supra note 135, at 58–59; Carlisle, supra note 135, at 901; Carlisle, supra
note 97, at 27.
142 See Sykas, supra note 137, at 934 (2001) (stating that public policy is “the primary rationale” supporting courts’ decisions in nearly all cases dealing with testamentary instructions to euthanize animals).
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ing.”143 In doing so, the court relied directly on both Capers’ Estate and Smith
v. Avanzino.144 Thus, when faced with a “clear directive” in which the testator
instructed the executor of his estate to destroy any animals owned by the testator at the time of his death, including his horses and mule, the court found the
provision legally unenforceable.145
While commentators have been generally supportive of the concept of a
public policy in favor of preserving animals’ lives,146 they have also expressed
caution about the effectiveness of this approach. One commentator noted that
“[w]hat is considered unethical at any given time depends on the public mores
prevalent in the community” and that “animals are killed daily in pounds, laboratories and for food without any unified public outcry against these practices.”147 As a result, the commentator estimated that a court “could just as easily”
find that a testamentary pet euthanasia provision does not violate public policy
as it could find the opposite.148 Another commentator noted that public policy
is “elusive” and not “clearly defined” and that decisions based on public policy
rationales rest on “legal fiction rather than the law.”149 Thus, this commentator
suggested that public policy should be employed only as an “acceptable backup” to other approaches more solidly grounded in law.150
Finally, the anti-waste doctrine has been used only sparingly in judicial approaches to testamentary pet euthanasia provisions since Capers’ Estate. In one
instance, a Canadian court relied on the anti-waste doctrine to find that a testator’s instruction that his four “horses [be] shot by the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and then buried” was not valid.151 The court noted that the instruction
had incited a strong public protest, although it also noted that such an outcry
would have been unlikely if the animals had been pigs rather than horses.152 In
its opinion, the court noted its doubt that the testator truly would have wanted
the horses killed if he had known that the horses would have been properly

143

In re Estate of Brand, No. 28473, slip op. at 6 (Vt. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999).
Id. at 4–6.
145 Id. at 3–7.
146 See, e.g., Sykas, supra note 137, at 939 (“Although animals are still legally accorded the
status of mere property, it is both morally and legally wrong to consider killing a living creature because of the sheer desire to do so. Therefore, courts have correctly refused to allow
the destruction of animals by will provision, despite the fact that without exception, testators’ reasons for doing so are carefully thought out.”); Carlisle, supra note 135, at 902 (labeling testamentary pet euthanasia provisions “offensive to the public”).
147 Carlisle, supra note 135, at 897–98 (“[W]hile a court could invalidate an animal destruction provision on this or another public policy ground, it could just as easily find the provision enforceable.”).
148 Id. at 898.
149 Sykas, supra note 137, at 934–35, 941.
150 Id. at 943–44 (advocating that testamentary pet euthanasia provisions should be invalidated as illegal under criminal laws targeting cruelty to animals).
151 In re Wishart Estate (1992), 129 N.B.R. 2d 397, 400, 419–20 (Can. N.B.Q.B.).
152 Id. at 401.
144
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cared for and not abused.153 Regardless of the testator’s preferences, the court
found that the provision was without legal effect because it would amount to “a
waste of resources and estate assets even if carried out humanely.”154 As a
wasteful provision, the court declared the instruction void.155
For their part, commentators have generally opined that the anti-waste doctrine only has limited applicability to testamentary pet euthanasia provisions:
Pets are considered personal property and where they have economic value, for
example because of their breed or pedigree, the policy against waste should prevent their destruction. However, most pets are mixed-breed animals with no
market value. Indeed, as they must be fed and otherwise cared for, they may be
considered to have a negative value. Presumably it does not violate the public
policy against waste to destroy estate property with no pecuniary value. Therefore, unless someone wishing to adopt the animal offered to purchase it from the
estate, its destruction would not affect the pecuniary value of the estate and so
would not be wasteful.156

The prevailing view among commentators has been that only the destruction of a monetarily valuable animal would run afoul of the anti-waste doctrine
and that a testamentary instruction to euthanize a mixed-breed animal, that is,
most ordinary pets, would not amount to waste.157
IV. HOW THE LAW SHOULD APPROACH DEAD-HAND CONTROL OVER PET
EUTHANIZATION
While the living are generally free to humanely euthanize their companion
animals, the dead should not be afforded the same power. The ability to euthanize an animal is simply not a power that the dead hand should possess.
While courts to date have generally reached the correct result when confronted
with the validity of a pet euthanization provision in a testamentary document,
the reasoning they have used to reach this result leaves much to be desired.158
The law’s approach to testamentary pet euthanasia provisions would benefit from consistency and certainty. Each time a court applies a mishmash of legal doctrines in an undisciplined way to reach a particular result, the law be-

153

The court expressly noted that since others had stepped forward to care for the horses
since the testator’s death, it had “the benefit of information that [the testator] did not have
when he made his will.” Id. at 407.
154 Id. at 419–20.
155 Id. at 420.
156 Carlisle, supra note 135, at 896.
157 E.g., Jamieson, supra note 135, at 56, 59 (noting that pet euthanization would amount to
waste of estate assets “at least in the case of a pedigreed animal”); Carlisle, supra note 97, at
27 (noting that courts may find that “[t]he animal is worthless property and there are no specific prohibitions against the destruction of property with no value”).
158 See supra Part III.
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comes distorted.159 These mutated doctrines elevate the risk that the law will be
misapplied in other situations.160 While courts have reached the correct result
regarding pet euthanasia provisions, they have muddied the waters to get there,
and the existing academic commentary on the issue has only stirred the pot to
produce even murkier results.161 It is time for some clarity.
Some commentators have gone so far as to say that legislation is the only
way to produce consistent results when a will includes a pet euthanasia provision.162 It is not. While it is true that legislation that clearly invalidates (or validates) such provisions is one way to clarify the legal landscape, it is an unnecessary one. The law of wills already has a clear answer for pet euthanization
provisions. No additional legislation is needed to address this recurring fact pattern.
A. Testamentary Pet Euthanasia Provisions are Void for Wastefulness
The clear answer is that pet euthanasia provisions should consistently be
invalidated using the anti-waste doctrine. Some courts have applied the antiwaste doctrine appropriately, but others have bypassed it for less sturdy analytical footing. This should not be so. When faced with a pet euthanasia provision,
all courts should begin and end the analysis with the anti-waste doctrine. It is
the most appropriate vehicle to invalidate these provisions. Thus, it is most unfortunate that the anti-waste doctrine has not been favored in the case law in
this area.163 This problem is only exacerbated by certain existing academic
commentary that erroneously implies or flat-out states that the anti-waste doctrine is inapplicable to most pets because they are not financially valuable.164
As explained earlier, the anti-waste doctrine is a limitation on dead-hand
control.165 Testators may not destroy from the grave what they preserved in life.
The anti-waste doctrine does not have a minimum dollar amount.166 A testamentary instruction to burn a one-dollar bill is as invalid as an instruction to
sink the Queen Mary into Long Beach Harbor.
Previous commentators have opined that most pets have negative value because they demand food, shelter, and care.167 This approach simply does not
square with how animals are treated elsewhere in the law. If someone negligently causes the death of Kaity’s dog or Kevin’s cat, we can recover in tort for
159

See, e.g., KEVIN BENNARDO, THINKING AND WRITING ABOUT LAW 46–56 (2021) (explaining the evolution of legal doctrines, including their mutation through judicial misapplication).
160 Id.
161 See supra Section III.C.
162 See supra note 135.
163 See supra Section III.C.
164 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
165 See supra Section II.B.
166 See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.

22 NEV. L.J. 349

372

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

the loss of our personal property.168 The damages may not be very much—
indeed, damages may be limited to the replacement cost of the animal from the
local shelter.169 But the law is not going to tell us that someone did us an economic favor by causing the death of our pet.170
The law does not deem companion animals to possess a negative value
simply because they require care and attention. Even adopting the strictest view
of animals as property, animals have some positive value.171 If it costs $50 to
adopt a cat, then the cat is worth $50. A testator cannot command the destruction of a $50 cat any more than she can command the destruction of a $50 bill.
Because companion animals are assets of the estate, the anti-waste doctrine
prevents testators from euthanizing them from beyond the grave.
It is true that the anti-waste doctrine is generally not judicially applied to
low-value assets. However, this is a consequence of practicality, not of legality.172 When a decedent requests that she be buried in a certain outfit of clothing
or piece of jewelry, that is waste.173 The living need not abide the instruction
under the anti-waste doctrine, but they generally go along with it anyway.174
Most beneficiaries are not going to make a fuss about the decedent taking a pair
of shoes or other low-value items with her to the grave. Thus, the issue does not
get litigated very often for non-living, low-value items.
Animals, however, are a different kind of low-value property. If the executor follows a testator’s instruction to burn a $50 bill, beneficiaries are rarely going to expend the effort to challenge the legality of that decision in court. But if
the executor intends to put a living animal to death, that occasionally will raise
some hackles. Animals are a peculiar type of low-value property precisely because some individuals assign a greater value to them than their replacement
cost. That is why there are numerous instances in the case law of challenges to
testamentary provisions seeking to destroy monetarily low-value animals but
few or no challenges to testamentary provisions seeking to destroy other lowvalue property.175 It is not that the anti-waste doctrine is inapplicable to low-

168

See supra Section I.A.
Remember that even a mean dog is worth $10 in the eyes of the law. See supra notes 17–
21 and accompanying text. We can assure you that no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that either Kaity’s dog or Kevin’s cat is mean.
170 Similarly, if someone steals one of our cars, the law is not going to tell us that the thief
did us an economic favor by relieving us from the expense of buying gasoline and insurance
and paying for repairs and maintenance.
171 See supra Section I.A.
172 But see Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 822 (opining that the law should tolerate the testamentary waste of estate assets as long as the waste “does not harm third parties substantially” (emphasis added)).
173 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 50, at 14–15 (focusing on testamentary destruction of high-value property).
169

22 NEV. L.J. 349

Fall 2021]

UNLEASHING PETS

373

value property; rather, it is that usually no one cares enough about low-value
property to bother to raise it.
Thus, the single, simple, and uniform solution to pet euthanasia provisions
in testamentary documents is to declare them invalid under the anti-waste doctrine. It matters not whether the object of the provision is a thoroughbred horse,
a designer dog, or a common housecat. The law clearly assigns value to all
companion animals.176 Because companion animals are estate assets and the
dead hand cannot waste estate assets, the dead hand has no legal power to order
the euthanization of a companion animal. The analysis really needn’t be any
more complicated than that.
B. Courts Should Abandon Other Approaches to Pet Euthanasia Provisions
We mentioned earlier that courts tend to apply other rationales to invalidate
pet euthanasia provisions rather than the anti-waste doctrine.177 What of them?
Well, courts should simply stop using them. They are not a good fit.
1. Stop Reforming Pet Euthanasia Provisions Contrary to Testators’
Expressed Intent
First, it is simply improper for a court to “interpret” (wink-wink) a testamentary provision to arrive at a particular preferred result. When a testator includes a provision that commands that all of the testator’s pets be humanely euthanized, there is no further interpretation needed. The provision is clear. It
says that the testator wants the animals to be dead. It does not say that the testator wants the animals to be alive unless they are going to be mistreated or
abandoned.
To arrive at such a tortured construction, courts often find that the testator
included the pet euthanasia provision based on a mistake of fact. Courts find
that the testator mistakenly believed that no one would care for their pet, and,
based on this mistaken belief, the testator believed that euthanasia was the best
available option.178 When someone steps forward to care for the animal, courts
then label the euthanasia provision unnecessary and disregard it.
This analysis misapplies the law surrounding mistakes of facts. Remember
that courts generally will not reform a will based on a testator’s mistake of
fact.179 Courts simply are not in a position to know whether the mistake of fact
was material to the testamentary instruction or not.180 They won’t rewrite an
instruction that states, “I leave my ranch to my son, Jim” to mean “I leave my
ranch to my son, Jim, but only if he is actually my biological son.”
176
177
178
179
180

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section III.C.
See, e.g., supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 85, at 324 (“Materiality is the great difficulty.”).
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Likewise, courts should not rewrite a testator’s instruction “to euthanize
my dog Bonniewinkle as soon as feasible after my passing” to mean an instruction “to euthanize my dog Bonniewinkle as soon as feasible after my passing
only if no one steps forward to care for her.” The testator could have included
such conditional language in the will but did not. The law of wills requires
courts to resist the temptation to write it in.181
After all, the law of wills is concerned with effectuating the decedent’s
preferences, not the court’s preferences or anyone else’s.182 Testamentary dispositions are not democratic.183 Rather, testamentary freedom requires the law
to validate bequests that the majority of society views to be ill-considered or
bizarre.184 Freedom of testation requires that it is the testator’s preferences that
are paramount. What anyone else thinks of the testator’s choices is, for the
most part, irrelevant.
Consulting extrinsic evidence to determine a decedent’s preferences, no
matter how tempting, is problematic.185 Extrinsic evidence substitutes the voices of the living for the decedent’s voice at the crucial moment when the decedent is no longer around to refute it.186 Courts should not consider extrinsic evidence that a decedent truly wanted her dog or cat to live in the face of a
painfully clear directive in the decedent’s will that she desired the animal to be
euthanized. The decedent’s will, executed according to all of the necessary
formalities for making a will, is how the decedent communicated her preferences regarding the disposition of her estate.
Each time the words of a will are not given their natural meaning, the value
of wills as a concept is diminished.187 Every misconstrued will cheapens the
values of wills in general. To safeguard the enterprise of will-making, courts
should be more protective of the words chosen by the testator. Well-intentioned
courts do no favors when they rewrite a testator’s chosen prose. While such judicial line editing or rewriting may appear preferable in certain individual cases, the result is a weakened incentive for individuals to create wills in general.

181

See supra notes 83–93 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
183 “One has a right to distribute property upon death solely according to the dictates of
one’s own desires, unfettered by the constraints of society’s moral code or the claims of others.” Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235
(1996).
184 See id.; see also Bennardo, supra note 52, at 602; Irene D. Johnson, There’s a Will, But
No Way—Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and What Can
(Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 105, 105–06 (2011); E.
Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 275,
276, 278 (1999).
185 See supra Section II.C.
186 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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After all, if the court is not going to take your verbiage seriously, why bother to
make a will at all?
The same rules of interpretation should be applied to pet euthanasia provisions as are applied to other provisions in a will. Manipulating the interpretation of a pet euthanasia provision to arrive at a contorted construction of the decedent’s intent because others find it more palatable undermines the bedrock
principle of testamentary freedom and creates bad precedent.
2. Stop Pretending There is a Public Policy in Favor of Preserving the
Lives of Animals
Second, the idea that there is a public policy in favor of preserving all animals’ lives is simply unfounded in our society. While our society generally abhors cruelty to animals or inhumane treatment, it does not recoil at the humane
killing of animals.188 When courts quote purple prose about the sanctity of all
forms of life, they are not espousing a public policy. They are espousing a personal belief or perhaps even an idealized version of a personal belief.189
Proof is all around us. Animals are killed every day.190 Some are our food.
Others are our laboratory subjects. Others are hunted for sport. Others are pets
who have simply outlived their utility to their owners. We wear them as our
clothes. We lace them into footballs. All of that is perfectly legal. Yes, a certain
segment of society raises objections to every instance of eating animals, performing tests on animals, or humanely euthanizing unwanted animals. But most
of society does not bat an eye at it. It is not the sort of widespread belief that
would support a finding of a public policy.191
Moreover, courts should not find a public policy in favor of preserving the
lives of all animals simply because there is public outcry over the killing of a
particular animal. While the concern over Sido the Dog’s life spurred thousands
of people to write letters in his support,192 that does not mean that the public in
general believes that the life of every animal should be preserved. If the public
felt that way, there would be laws against humanely euthanizing animals. There
are not.193 Even Sido only prompted the California legislature to enact a special
piece of legislation that applied to him and him alone.194 The law does not simi188

See supra Section I.B.
For example, the Capers’ Estate court quoted extensive passages about the meaning of
the phrase “reverence for life” from Albert Sweitzer’s 1931 autobiography, Out of My Life
and Thought. In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 130–32 (Orphans’ Ct. 1964).
190 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
191 As one example, only 1 to 2 percent of Americans self-describe as vegans. See Matthew
Zampa, How Many Vegans Are There Really in the U.S.?, SENTIENT MEDIA (May 20, 2019),
https://sentientmedia.org/how-many-vegans-are-there-in-the-u-s/ [perma.cc/F4WA-L86K]
(aggregating results from twenty-four separate studies).
192 See supra Section III.B.
193 See supra Section I.B.
194 See supra Section III.B.
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larly prioritize the lives of all other canines.195 Public outcry over one dog does
not create a public policy favoring the preservation of every animal’s life.
Courts that recognize a generalized public policy seemingly are compelled
to do so by public pressure and a desire to reach a particular result. Neither are
appropriate reasons to invent a public policy. As explained above, majoritarian
public sentiment and testamentary freedom do not mix.196 A commitment to
one comes at the exclusion of the other. In terms of strict testamentary freedom,
it matters not that thousands of people wanted Sido to live. The only relevant
input is that the testatrix expressed an unambiguous desire for him to die. While
a court may shudder at the thought of euthanizing a particular dog or a cat, especially when an offer of adoption is pending, such sentiments do not provide a
solid foundation for recognizing a public policy in favor of preservation of all
creatures great and small. A court that manufactures a public policy into existence merely to reach its preferred ends in a particular case does damage to the
law.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have done a poor job with testamentary provisions ordering a pet’s death. They know that they do not want to enforce them,
but they have struggled to identify a single, consistent, legally defensible reason why. To reach their preferred result, they do silly things. Some have reformed the testator’s words into something they deem more palatable based on
a supposed mistake of fact. Others have invented an unwieldy public policy in
favor of preserving the life of every living creature. These approaches misapply
and distort existing legal doctrines. Thus, they should be abandoned.
We do not fault the intuitions of these courts and commentators. They were
right that testamentary pet euthanasia provisions are not legally enforceable;
they just stumbled when attempting to explain why. Thankfully, there is one
consistent, legally defensible reason why decedents lack the power to make life
and death decisions on their pets’ behalf. Quite simply, pets are estate assets,
and decedents lack the power to waste estate assets. Assigning a positive value
to pets is consistent with how companion animals are treated in other areas of
the law, such as torts and bankruptcy. Once the law of wills accepts the premise
that even mixed-breed pets have value, the rest of the analysis is uncomplicated: decedents cannot order the deaths of their pets because doing so is wasteful.
This single, simple analysis should be applied to testamentary pet euthanasia
provisions in the future.
195

As but one example, California law permits livestock owners to kill on sight any dog that
trespasses on their property. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 31103 (West 2021) (“[A]ny
dog entering any enclosed or unenclosed property upon which livestock or poultry are confined may be seized or killed by the owner or tenant of the property or by any employee of
the owner or tenant. No action, civil or criminal, shall be maintained against the owner, tenant, or employee for the seizure or killing of any such dog.”).
196 See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
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